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Negotiating Resolution of Environmental
Enforcement Actions
JON S. FALE'ro*
INTRoDUCrION

The best defense against an environmental enforcement action is
aggressive identification and correction of compliance problems before they
come to the attention of government regulators or citizens' groups. Periodic
compliance audits and education of employees responsible for environmental
compliance will help prevent many enforcement actions from ever being
brought. Management's commitment to maintaining environmental compliance is also an essential element in avoiding enforcement action.
Unfortunately, even the most conscientious company will occasionally
be subject to enforcement action. A recent survey of corporate counsel who
handle environmental compliance matters found that nearly seventy percent
(70%) of those surveyed acknowledged that their businesses operated at least
a portion of the previous year in violation of state or federal environmental
laws.' In addition, seventy percent (70%) of those corporate counsel surveyed
believed that full and continuous compliance with all environmental
requirements was not achievable 2 "due to the complexity of the law, the
varying interpretations of regulations, the ever-present role of human error and
cost."

3

At the inception of a formal enforcement action, the target of the action
must develop an effective strategy. Although development of an effective
strategy is extremely dependent upon the facts and legal issues present in the
case and typically changes as the enforcement action progresses, some basic
steps must be taken. First, the target of the enforcement action should
evaluate the strength of the government's claims. At a minimum, this
evaluation must include:
Careful examination of factual allegations and statutory or regulatory authority cited in the complaint or
administrative order.
*
Shareholder, Howard & Howard Attorneys, P.C., in Peoria, Illinois and Bloomfield
Hills, Lansing and Kalamazoo, Michigan. Mr. Faletto specializes in Environmental Law and
is licensed in the states of Illinois, Missouri, Michigan and Indiana.
1. Marianne Lavelle, Environment Vise: Law, Compliance,NAT'LL.J., Aug. 30,1993,
at S1, S2.
2. See id.
3. Id.
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Comparison of the alleged violations with the company's recollection of the facts or events, with an
analysis of the company's version of the facts with the
regulations allegedly violated.
Once the company has a basic understanding of the government's claims,
it should evaluate whether it has any effective defenses. Defenses available
to the company typically fall within one of three categories: regulatory, legal
and factual. Regulatory defenses are the most common in environmental
enforcement actions and are identified by the following questions:
*
*
*

Is the regulation allegedly violated applicable to the
company's operations?
Does a different regulation or exemption apply?
Does there exist a conflict between regulations?

Legal defenses, in general, will bar the enforcement of regulations, even
though the regulations are valid and the facts alleged by the government are
basically true. Legal defenses can include lack of jurisdiction, the doctrine of
resjudicataand expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, as well as
defenses expressly available under the statute being enforced.
Factual defenses are the easiest to identify, but may not be the easiest to
prove. Factual defenses include such arguments as:
*
*
*

It did not happen the way the government alleged in its
complaint or administrative order.
We reported it to the government in the manner
alleged, but we did not report additional facts which
show no violation occurred.
We reported the facts all wrong and the government's
allegations are based on a mistake.

The availability of viable defenses will weigh heavily in the decision to
settle the case and in the ultimate outcome of the proceeding. Even where
defenses are not particularly strong, they often affect the government's
position on the appropriate amount of civil penalties and/or the extent of
mitigation. Settlement discussions will always be affected by defenses which
diminish the strength of the government's case.
The final step in the strategic analysis is to evaluate the possibility for
and potential benefits of reaching an early settlement of the enforcement
action. Even if there are defenses available which make winning a distinct
possibility, the question remains, "At what cost?"
As a practical matter, the company's managers must consider the costs
of disputing a penalty or other enforcement action. Legal fees can often be
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substantial. In addition, a successful defense may require the use of
environmental consultants or other expert witnesses. There are also related
litigation expenses, such as the cost of deposition transcripts, copies, travel
and other out-of-pocket costs that need to be considered. Finally, the
company's managers should be aware that its employees may be devoting a
substantial portion of their work day assisting with defense of the enforcement action.
The final step in developing a strategic resolution of an environmental
enforcement action is to evaluate the potential civil penalties at stake. In
many cases, the government agency pursuing the action will voluntarily share
its penalty calculations with the company. The calculations should be
analyzed to verify compliance with statutory criteria established for that
purpose. Alternatively, the government may not have properly considered
mitigating factors which serve to lower the amount of penalty considered
"appropriate." Finally, there may be options available for the company to
realize some true "value" for its penalty payment rather than as a contribution
to the government's coffers, such as through Supplemental Environmental
Projects."
The purpose of this article is to provide an understanding of how civil
penalties are calculated, how they can be reduced and ways to secure some
"return of value" to the company. The concept of recouping the economic
benefit of non-compliance is also addressed. Finally, there may be unanticipated consequences of settling an environmental enforcement action.
I.

OVERVIEW OF ILLINOIS LAW APPLICABLE TO CIVIL
PENALTY ASSESSMENTS

A.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO CIVIL PENALTY ASSESSMENTS

The Illinois Environmental Protection Act (the Act) sets forth statutory
criteria that must be followed in establishing appropriate civil penalties for
violations of the Act or implementing regulations.5 Section 33(b) of the Act
authorizes the Pollution Control Board (the Board) to impose civil penalties
for violations of "the Act or of the Board's rules and regulations or of any
permit or term or condition thereof ...in accord with Section 42 of this
Act."6 Section 42(a) of the Act provides for a civil penalty not to exceed
4. Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg. 24,
796 (1998).
5. 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1-58.14 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998).
6. 415 Iil. Comp. Stat. 5/33(b) (West 1997).
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$50,000 for each violation and an additional penalty not to exceed $10,000 for
each day in which the violation continues.7
1. Section 33(c) "Reasonableness" Factors
Section 33(c) sets forth five factors which the Board must consider in
making its determinations, including determinations to impose civil penalties.
Section 33(c) states:
(c) In making its orders and determinations, the Board
shall take into consideration all the facts and circumstances
bearing upon the reasonableness of the emissions, discharge
or deposits involved including, but not limited to:
(i) the character and degree of injury to, or interference with the protection of the health, general
welfare and physical property of the people;
(ii) the social and economic value of the pollution
source;
(iii) the suitability or unsuitability of the pollution
source to the area in which it is located, including
the question of priority of location in the area
involved;
(iv) the technical practicability and economic reasonableness of reducing or eliminating the emissions,
discharges or deposits resulting from such pollution source;' and
(v) any subsequent compliance.'
The Board is required to consider the factors outlined in section 33(c) of
°
the Act in determining the "reasonableness" of the alleged pollution.' This
does not mean, however, that the Board must find against the company with
respect to each of the five statutory criteria to support a lawful determination
to impose civil penalties." Nor is the Board precluded by the section 33(c)

7. 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/42(a) (West 1997).
8. 415 Il. Comp. Stat. 5/33 (c) (West 1997); Processing & Books, Inc. v. Pollution
Control Bd., 351 N.E.2d 865, 866-67 (Ill. 1976).
9. 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/33 (c) (West 1997).
10. See Mystik Tape, Div. of Borden, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 328 N.E.2d 5, 8
(Ill. 1975).
11. See Processing & Books, 351 N.E.2d at 868 (quoting Incinerator, Inc. v. Pollution
Control Bd., 319 N.E.2d 794, 798-99 (I11.1974)).

19981

RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

criteria from evaluating additional relevant factors. 2
After noting that the section 33(c) criteria provide guidelines to govern
the conduct of those affected by the Act, the Illinois Supreme Court in Wells
Manufacturing Co. v. The Pollution Control Board13 affirmed the appellate
court's reversal of a Board Order imposing $8,500 in civil penalties, a pollution abatement plan and performance bond. Essentially, the court found that
the Board had not proven the "unreasonableness" of odorous emissions from
a foundry operation through application of the section 33(c) criteria. 4 In upholding reversal of the Board's Order and civil penalty, the court found it
significant that the foundry was in operation at its existing location long
before most of the neighboring residents who complained about the foundry's
objectionable odorous emissions (the section 33(c)(iii) factor); and the
absence of a proven technical solution to control the odorous emissions (the
section 33(c)(iv) factor)."
In more recent enforcement actions, the section 33(c) criteria have been
considered together with the section 42(h) factors to determine whether the
civil penalty is appropriate. 6 Where four of the five section 33(c) criteria
favored the alleged violator, the Board in a fairly recent case reduced the
amount of the civil penalty from $254,100 proposed by the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) to $60,000 and refused to revoke the
company's operating permits. 7 The reviewing court upheld the Board's order
despite evidence of subsequent noncompliance (the section 33(c)(v) factor),
and proof of all of the aggravating factors specified in section 42(h) save a
serious and harmful violation. 8
2. Section 42(h) Factorsto "Mitigate" and "Aggravate" the Civil
Penalty
In determining the appropriate civil penalty to be assessed for statutory
or regulatory violations, the Board must consider any matters of record in
mitigation or aggravation of a penalty, including but not limited to the factors

12.

See Processing & Books, 351 N.E.2d at 867.

14.

See id. at 150, 153.

13.
15.

Wells Mfg. Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 338 N.E.2d 148 (Ill. 1978).
Id. at 152-53; see also CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 336 N.E.2d 601,

605 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (stating that because the Board's Order did not specify whether the
statutory standard of section 33(c) had been met, the court vacated the Board's Order imposing
$10,000 in civil penalties).
16. See ESG Watts v. Pollution Control Bd., 668 N.E.2d 1015 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
17. See People v. James Lee Watts, No. 94-127, Ill. Env. LEXIS 450 pg. *17-*18 (Ill.
Pollution Control Bd. May 4, 1995).
18. See ESG Watts, 668 N.E.2d at 1021.
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specified in section 42(h). 9 Those factors are as follows:
(h) In determining the appropriate civil penalty to be
imposed under subdivisions (a), (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), or
(b)(5) of this Section, the Board is authorized to consider
any matters of record in mitigation or aggravation of
penalty, including but not limited to the following factors:
(1) the duration and gravity of the violation;
(2) the presence or absence of due diligence on the
part of the violator in attempting to comply with
requirements of this Act and regulations thereunder or to secure relief therefrom as provided by
this Act;
(3) any economic benefits accrued by the violator
because of delay in compliance with requirements;
(4) the amount of monetary penalty which will serve
to deter further violations by the violator and to
otherwise aid in enhancing voluntary compliance
with this Act by the violator and other persons
similarly subject to the Act; and
(5) the number, proximity in time, and gravity of
previously adjudicated violations of this Act by
the violator.20
Historically, Illinois courts have held that the primary purpose of civil
penalties is to aid in enforcement of the Act, and punitive considerations are
secondary.2" The decisions in civil penalty cases, which predate the 1990
effective date of section 42(h), suggest that whenever compliance has been
achieved, punishment through civil penalties is not necessary.2 2 With the
incorporation of the section 42(h) factors into the Act it is now clear that the
deterrent effect of civil penalties on the violator and on potential violators is
a legitimate goal for the Board to consider when imposing penalties.2 3
Although the section 42(h) factors are somewhat self-explanatory,
19. 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/24(h) (West 1997).
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., City of Moline v. Pollution Control Bd., 478 N.E.2d 906,908 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1985) (stating penalties are imposed primarily to aid in enforcement of the act rather than
to impose punishment); City of Chicago v. Pollution Control Bd., 373 N.E.2d 512, 515 (111.
App. Ct. 1978) (stating that monetary penalties must not be imposed solely to set an example).
22. See ESG Watts, 668 N.E.2d at 1021.
23.

Id.
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decisions by the Board and the court in applying those factors to particular
factual scenarios provide guidance to companies faced with an enforcement
action. The court's decision in Park Crematory,Inc. v. The Pollution Control
Board,24 is a particularly good example of how the section 42(h) factors can
work to the Company's favor. In that case, the Board imposed a civil penalty
of $9,000 for operating an incinerator for a period of nine years without a
permit, and by failing to obtain a construction permit for a second
incinerator.25 The court reversed the Board and held that no civil penalty was
authorized by the Act because the company "realized almost no economic
advantage from the noncompliance," was "not beyond the regulatory
awareness of the agency," and acted in "good faith. 2 6
II.

GUIDANCE FROM FEDERAL STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND

POLICY DOCUMENTS

EPA

All of the major federal environmental statutes provide for the imposition
of administrative violations of penalties, civil penalties and criminal penalties
for violations of the law, implementing regulations, or for violations of an
administrative order or permit issued pursuant to the law.27 Because
environmental statutes are public welfare statutes, any of these potential
penalties (including criminal penalties) may result from a violation, even
though the offensive conduct was performed with a "good faith" belief that the
conduct complied with relevant laws. In other words, these potential
2
liabilities are based on what is essentially a standard of strict liability. 1
A.

CLEAN AIR ACT STATUTORY PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO CIVIL
PENALTY ASSESSMENTS

Federal laws empower the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) with a great deal of discretion in determining whether to
pursue a violation and in determining which penalties are appropriate. That
discretion is limited, however, by statutory constraints and enumerated factors

24. Park Crematory, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 637 N.E.2d 520 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
25. See id. at 521.
26. Id. at 525.
27. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413 (West 1995) (Clean Air Act); 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319
(West 1986 & Supp. 1998) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928 (West 1995) (Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976); 42 U.S.C.A. § 9609 (West 1995) (Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability); 42 U.S.C.A. § 11045 (West 1995)
(Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know); 15 U.S.C.A. § 2615 (West 1998) (Toxic
Substances Control Act).
28. United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 559 F.2d 368, 374 (10th Cir. 1979).
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that must be considered when determining what level of civil penalty is
"appropriate."
In addition, the EPA has developed extensive guidance materials which
the EPA uses in calculating civil penalties and in evaluating settlement
options.29 The EPA's penalty policies were developed to provide EPA
enforcement staff with a logical calculation methodology for determining
appropriate penalties.30 The policies allow the EPA to "apply the statutory
penalty factors in a consistent and equitable manner so that members of the
regulated community are treated similarly for similar violations across the
country."31
Understanding the published EPA guidance documents will allow the
company faced with an enforcement action to verify that the civil penalty
proposed by the government was properly calculated and more importantly,
to identify aggravating and mitigating factors that may not have been properly
considered by the EPA.32 There are almost always facts that can be developed
by the company to show that additional mitigation of the government's
proposed civil penalty is warranted.
As one of the oldest and most comprehensive environmental statutes, the
Clean Air Act (CAA) provides a good example of what factors are considered
by the government in calculating a civil penalty and common statutory
constraints imposed by the legislature.3 3 Under section 113 of the CAA, the
administrator of the EPA may commence a civil judicial action or initiate
administrative proceedings to recover civil penalties for violations of the law,
implementing regulations, an agency order or permits issued pursuant to the
CAA.
The 1990 CAA amendments added section 7413(e) to clarify the rules for
penalty assessments by the administrator or the courts. Factors to be
considered are, "the size of the business, the economic impact of the penalty
on the business, the violator's full compliance history and good faith efforts
29. See, e.g., EPA, Clean Air Act Stationary Source Civil Penalty Policy, 1991 CPP
LEXIS 7 (Oct. 25, 1991).
30. See id. at *8.
31. EPA, Guidanceon Use of PenaltyPolicies in Administrative Litigation, 1996 CPP
LEXIS 1 (Dec. 15, 1996).
32. The EPA has developed Civil Penalty Policies for all of the regulatory programs it
enforces. Each Policy provides useful guidance to assist a company in negotiating a reduction
in the proposed civil penalty. See, e.g., EPA, Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA):
PolychlorinatedBiphenyls("PCB") Penalty Policy, 1990 CPP LEXIS 15 (Apr. 9, 1990); EPA,
Resource ConservationRecovery Act (RCRA): Civil PenaltyPolicy, 1990 CPP LEXIS 17 (Oct.
1990).
33. Arthur C. Stem, History of Air Pollution Legislation in the United States, 32
JOURNAL OF THE AIR POLLUTION CONTROL Ass'N 44 (Jan. 1982).
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to comply, the duration of the violation as established by any credible
evidence (including evidence other than the applicable test method), payment
by the violator of penalties previously assessed for the same violation, the
economic benefit of noncompliance, and the seriousness of the violation."34
The courts are also bound by the statutory criteria when determining the
maximum applicable statutory fine. If the court decides to reduce the fine, it
must be done in accordance with the statutory factors. The court must
indicate the weight it gives to each factor and the findings that support its
conclusion.35
B.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY'S CIVIL PENALTY POLICIES

The EPA's methodology for calculating a civil penalty for violations of
the CAA are set out in a policy document that was last revised on October 25,
1991.36 The general policy applies to most CAA violations; however, ten
appendices cover noncompliance with certain CAA program requirements that
warrant more specific treatment than the general policy provides. Appendix
I covers stationary source permit requirements.37 Appendix II covers vinyl
chloride National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
(NESHAP) violations.3" Appendix M covers asbestos NESHAP demolition
and renovation violations.3 9 Appendix IV covers Volatile Organic Com4
pounds (VOCs) sources using reformulation to low solvent technology. 0
Appendix V is a civil penalty work sheet.4 ' Appendix VI covers the volatile
hazardous air pollutant civil penalty policy.42 Appendix VII covers residential
wood heaters.43 Appendix VIII deals with substances that deplete stratospheric ozone." Appendix IX establishes civil penalty assessment criteria for
individuals who service motor vehicle air conditioners and who sell small

34.
35.

42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(e)(1) (West 1995).
See Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Tyson Foods, 897 F.2d 1128, 1142 (11th Cir.

1990); see also United States v. SCM Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1110, 1126 (D. Md. 1987).
36. See EPA, Clean Air Act Stationary Source Civil Penalty Policy, 1991 CPP Lexis

7(Oct. 25, 1991); see also EPA, Clarificationof the October 25, 1991 Clean Air Act Stationary
Source Civil Penalty Policy, 1992 CPP LEXIS 3 (Jan. 17, 1992).
37. EPA, Clean Air Act Stationary Source Civil Penalty Policy, 1991 CPP LEXIS 7,
*57 (Oct. 25, 1991)[hereinafter "EPA--CAA"].
38. Id. at *72.
39. Id. at *77-78.
40. Id. at *104-05.
41.

Id. at * 112.

42.
43.
44.

EPA--CAA, supra note 37, at *113.
Id. at *119.
Id. at *124.
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containers of refrigerant.45 Appendix X provides guidance for calculating
civil penalties for violations involving the maintenance, service, repair and
disposal of appliances containing refrigerant.46
The general Civil Penalty Policy focuses on the two elements of a civil
penalty - an amount to remove any significant "economic benefit" resulting
from noncompliance and the "gravity" component to reflect the seriousness
of the violation. 47 One source of economic benefit that results from noncompliance is the savings from "deferred cost." This includes failure to install
needed air pollution control equipment, failure to effect process changes to
reduce pollution control equipment, failure to effect process changes to reduce
pollution, failure to perform required tests, and failure to install required
monitoring equipment. Economic benefits are to be computed using
Technical Appendix A of the EPA's "BEN User's Manual. 4 a
The second source of receiving an economic benefit or advantage as a
result of noncompliance with environmental requirements is by avoiding costs
that the source otherwise would have been required to incur. The benefit from
"avoided costs" must also be recouped through the civil penalty imposed on
the alleged violator. Types of violations that enable a violator to permanently
avoid certain costs associated with compliance include:
"
"
•
*
"
•
*

Disconnecting or failing to properly operate and
maintain existing pollution control equipment (or other
equipment if it affects pollution control);
Failure to employ a sufficient number of adequately
trained staff;
Failure to establish or follow precautionary methods
required by regulations or permits;
Removal of pollution equipment resulting in process,
operational, or maintenance savings;
Failure to conduct a test which is no longer required;
Disconnecting or failing to properly operate and
maintain required monitoring equipment; and
Operation and maintenance of equipment that the
violator failed to install.49

45. Id. at *144.
46. Id. at *174.
47. EPA-CAA, supra note 37, at *161.
48. The standard method in settlement efforts for calculating the economic benefit from
delayed and avoided pollution control expenditures is through the EPA's BEN model. EPA,
BEN: A Model to Calculate The Economic Benefits of Noncompliance, A1-A34 (1993).
49. EPA, supra note 29, at *11-12.
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The benefit from avoided cost also must be computed using Technical
Appendix A of the BEN User's Manual."°
It is the EPA's general policy not to mitigate the economic benefit
component of penalties, but there are at least two exceptions where the
amount is insignificant or compelling public policy calls for mitigation.
Under the CAA Civil Penalty Policy, the EPA may agree to accept a civil
penalty that does not recoup the full economic benefit under the following
three scenarios:
"
*

"

If the economic benefit resulting from the noncompliance was calculated to be less than $5,000;s"
If there is a compelling public concern. For example,
if it would result in-a-plant closing that would not
occur otherwise or if the action is against non-profit
public entities, such as municipalities and publiclyowned utilities, where an assessment would threaten to
disrupt essential public services.52
If EPA has already recovered the economic benefit of
noncompliance in a previous administrative action
under Section 120 of the Clean Air Act and would not
enseek a double recovery in a subsequent judicial
53
forcement action under Section 113 of the Act.

The "gravity" component of the civil penalty requires the EPA to
consider the elements set forth in CAA Section 113(e). The policy guideline
further explains key terms such as the amount of the pollutant, the sensitivity
of the environment to the toxicity of the pollutant, the length of time a
violation continues, and the size of the violator.
Calculating the gravity component is a function of three determinations.
First, the EPA assesses the actual or potential harm caused by the violation.
A dollar figure is assigned based on the level of violation, toxicity of the
pollutants, sensitivity of the environment, and the length of the violation.54
Second, the EPA assesses the importance of the offense to the regulatory
scheme. The policy enumerates specific dollar penalties to be assessed in
connection with reporting violations and operation and maintenance

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

EPA BEN User's Manual, supra note 48.
EPA, supra note 29, at *14.
Id. at *15.
See id. at *17.
See id. at *19-23.
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shortcomings.55 Finally, the EPA takes into account the size of the violator.
The policy provides a sliding scale of penalties to be assessed based on the
violator's net current assets.56
The civil penalty program is intended to be equitable and allow for a
certain amount of administrative flexibility. The "gravity" component can be
adjusted to reflect considerations such as the degree of willfulness and/or
negligence, the extent of cooperation or lack thereof, the speed with which the
violation was corrected, the history of noncompliance, and the environmental
benefit of reaching a prompt solution.57 The Policy essentially applies the
factors specified by the statute to reduce the "gravity" component of the civil
penalty.
1. Degree of Willfulness or Negligence (aggravation). This factor only
may be used to raise a penalty. In deciding whether a penalty should be
raised, the EPA must consider the violator's degree of control over and ability
to foresee the events leading to the violation, the level of sophistication within
the industry for dealing with compliance issues, and the extent to which the
violator knew of the legal requirement that was violated.58
2. Degree of Cooperation(mitigation). The EPA expects all sources
in violation to comply expeditiously and to negotiate in good faith. The
gravity factor may be lowered by thirty percent (30%) if the violator
immediately reports the noncompliance, if violations are properly corrected,
and if cooperation is shown during the investigation.59 The EPA considers the
"prompt correction of environmental problems" to include such efforts as
paying for extra work shifts, paying to have control equipment installed
quickly, or the shutting down of a facility until compliance can be achieved.'
3. History of Noncompliance (aggravation). This factor only may be
used to raise a penalty. In determining this adjustment, the EPA must consider
the similarity and the number of past violations and the time that has elapsed
since the last such violation. "Similar" may mean a violation of the same
permit, emissions standard, or statutory or regulatory provisions, a similar act
or omission, or a violation at the same process points of a source.6'
4. Environmental Damage (aggravation). Although the gravity
component takes into account damage to the environment, it may be further
increased if the violation is so severe that the gravity component alone is not
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See id. at *23-27.
See id. at *27-28.
EPA, supra note 29, at *28-30.
See id. at *31-32.
See id. at *31-32.
Id. at *32.
See id. at *33-34.
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a sufficient deterrent.62 An example would be a significant release of an air
toxic in a populated area.
5. Ability to Pay (mitigation). The Company's "ability to pay" is
considered as another justification for mitigation of the civil penalty. The EPA
63
will generally not require penalties beyond the violator's ability to pay.
Ability to pay is considered in adjusting the preliminary deterrence amount
and the gravity as well as the economic benefit component. The EPA reserves
the right to seek a penalty that may contribute to a company going out of
business but the Courts have generally refused to impose a penalty that would
It is unlikely that the EPA would reduce a
cause economic bankruptcy.'
penalty if a facility refuses to correct a serious violation or if a source has a
long history of previous violations.
The EPA only may consider the financial well-being of a company if the
source raises it as an issue and if it provides the necessary financial information relating to its claim. If a violator proves that it is unable to pay a penalty
and EPA is unwilling to reduce the amount of the penalty, EPA may consider
delaying the payment schedule with interest.65 In court, the violator must
sustain its burden of proof showing that a penalty would have a "serious"
impact on their business, before the court will reduce an otherwise appropriate
penalty amount.66
In addition, both the economic benefit and the gravity components may
be mitigated based on litigation risk.67 Litigation risks may involve evidentiary problems, caps on the amounts that are imposed by the statute, and
adverse legal precedent. 6' There may also be offsets allowed for penalties
69
paid to state and local governments or citizen groups for the same violations.
If supplemental environmental'projects are to be used in lieu of a penalty, such
projects are subject to the May 1, 1998, FinalEPA Supplemental Environmen-

62. See id. at *36.
63. EPA, Guidance on Determining a Violator's Ability to Pay a Civil Penalty, (GM56) (Dec. 16, 1986), cited in EPA, CleanAir Stationary Source Civil Penalty Policy, 1991 CPP
LEXIS (Oct. 25, 1991) at *39.
64. See United States v. T. Bruce Smith, No. 96-2450, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 12969
(4th Cir. June 18, 1998).
65. EPA supra note 29, at *39-41.
66. Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of Southfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542
(E.D. Va. 1985).
67. See EPA supra note 29, at *36.
68. See id. at *37-38.
69. See id. at *41-43.
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tal Projects Policy.7" The use of Supplemental Environmental Projects is
discussed in more detail in the following sections.
Note that where the EPA relies on one of its Civil Penalty Policies during
the course of a hearing to justify its assessed civil penalty, it must through
evidence, support the assumptions, findings, and conclusions on which that
policy rests. From an evidentiary standpoint, no presumption of validity
attaches to an Agency policy statement. 7' At least one EPA Administrative
Law Judge has reduced the civil penalty because the EPA did not proffer
evidence to support the findings, conclusions and estimate of a Civil Penalty
72
Policy.
C.

CASE HISTORY-APPLICATION OF EPA'S CIVIL PENALTY POLICY IN
AN ENFORCEMENT ACTION BROUGHT UNDER THE EMERGENCY
PLANNING AND COMMUNITY RIGHT-TO-KNOW ACT (EPCRA)

The following discussion summarizes resolution of an actual administrative enforcement action brought by the EPA under the EPCRA program
against "the Company," for alleged violations of the EPCRA implementing
regulations.
The statutory factors under section 325 of EPCRA that must be
considered by the EPA and the courts when determining the amount of civil
penalty to be imposed are almost identical to the CAA factors noted in the
preceding discussion.73 Similar to the EPA's Civil Penalty Policy for CAA
violations, the EPA's Civil Penalty Policy applicable to EPCRA cases uses
mathematical formulas to first calculate the "overall seriousness" of the
noncompliance and the economic benefit gained by the alleged violator.74
Once the base penalty is calculated, the agency applies the statutory factors to
aggravate (increase) or mitigate (reduce) the base penalty amount.75 The
70. Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg.
24,796 (1998). EPA issued a revised and final guidance document for use of supplemental
environmental projects in settlement of environmental enforcement cases, "EPA Supplemental
Environmental Projects Policy." Id.
71. Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
72. In re Employers Insurance Company of Wausau, No. TSCA-V-C-62-90, 1995
TSCA LEXIS 15, at *50; see also In re Hall Signs, Inc. 1997 EPCRA LEXIS 25 (Oct. 30,
1997).
73. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11045 (West 1998) (Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-

Know).

74. EPA, Final Penalty Policy for Sections 302, 303, 304, 311 and 312 of the
Emergency Planningand Community Right-to-Know Act and Section 103 of the Comprehensive
EnvironmentalResponse Compensation and LiabilityAct, 1990 CPP LEXIS 19 (June 13, 1990)
[hereinafter EPCRA].
75. See id at *39-53.
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EPA's EPCRA Civil Penalty Policy lists the following factors to be used in
the "adjustment" process: ability to pay/continue in business (downward
adjustment only); prior history of violations (upward adjustment only); and
the degree of culpability, i.e., knowledge, control and good faith (upward or
downward adjustment). 76
The civil penalty reductions realized in the case described below were
directly related to the EPA's Civil Penalty Policy for EPCRA cases. It
provides a good example of how the EPA applied its Policy to calculate a
penalty and how the penalty can be reduced by establishing the presence of
the mitigating factors. Identities have been changed or omitted to preserve
confidentiality and to protect individual privacy rights, even though this
proceeding is a matter of public record.
1. Backgroundand Initiation of EPA Enforcement Action
Based on discussions with EPA personnel, primarily the Assistant
Regional Counsel and the Staff Engineer, this enforcement action was
initiated as a result of an employee accident." This accident resulted in the
injury of one employee and the death of another, after being overcome by
fumes while cleaning a trichloroethylene ("TCE") solvent storage tank.
Following the accident, the EPA began investigating the Company's
compliance with the EPCRA program and implementing regulations. Letters
were sent to the local fire department, the County health department, and the
State Department of Natural Resources ("DNR"), requesting information on
the Company's compliance with the EPCRA program. The appropriate
official at each agency was asked to prepare an affidavit attesting to the
Company's noncompliance with various provisions of the EPCRA program.
As a result of its investigations, the EPA determined that the Company
had violated Section 311 of EPCRA, which requires submittal of Material
Safety Data Sheets ("MSDS") to the local fire department, the local emergency planning committee ("LEPC") (which was the County Health
Department), and the State Emergency Response Commission ("SERC").
Because the Company had filed its comprehensive emergency response plan
with the local fire department, and the plan contained the MSDS sheets, the
Company was cited for failing to submit MSDS sheets to the LEPC and
SERC, but not the local fire department. Two violations were alleged for
failing to submit the appropriate MSDS sheets to the County and the MDNR.

76.
77.

Id. at*40-41.
This information comes from an actual case in which the author was involved.
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In addition to the EPCRA section 311 violations, the EPA cited the
Company for violating section 312 of EPCRA, which requires preparation and
submittal of a Tier I or Tier H emergency and hazardous chemical inventory
form (inventory forms) to the local fire department, LEPC, and SERC. Based
on the investigations conducted by the EPA, which consisted primarily of
requests to the appropriate agencies, the EPA alleged violations of EPCRA
section 312 for the years 1987 through 1991.
In summary, the EPA was alerted to a situation of potential noncompliance through the July 1992 employee accident, either through media reports
or possibly citizens' complaints. The EPA then contacted the local fire
department, the County health department, and the State to determine whether
the Company had submitted the required EPCRA paperwork.
2.

Calculationof the Proposed Civil Penalty Under EPA's EPCRA Civil
Penalty Policy

Enforcement actions brought under the EPCRA program are subject to
a published Civil Penalty Policy, which is a document issued by EPA as
guidance to EPA enforcement personnel.78 The EPCRA Civil Penalty Policy
is similar to the CAA Civil Penalty Policy discussed in the preceding section,
particularly in the evaluation and application of the various mitigating and
aggravating factors. The EPCRA Civil Penalty Policy establishes a three-step
procedure for determining the appropriate civil penalty for a violation of the
EPCRA requirements. First, the "extent of deviation" from the regulatory
requirement is assessed.79 A failure to submit the necessary EPCRA
paperwork is considered the maximum extent of deviation under the Policy.
Second, the "gravity of violation" is assessed. In considering this second
component, the EPA is directed to determine the maximum amount of a
specific chemical present during the previous calendar year.8" If the amount
of any hazardous chemical not reported in the EPCRA inventory form was
greater than the reporting threshold (e.g. 10,000 pounds for TCE), then the
"gravity of violation" is considered. If the amount of chemical present at the
facility was 5 times the threshold (i.e., 50,000 pounds for TCE), the "gravity"
component is a Level B moderate violation.
Third, the EPA is required to consider the circumstances of the alleged
violations to arrive at a specific penalty figure within a specified range.8' It

78.
79.
80.

81.

EPCRA, supra note 74, at *1-5.
See id. at *20-29.
See id. at *29-33.

See idat *33-37.
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is this component of the penalty calculation where the EPA is given wide
discretion. In this case, most of the company's arguments for reducing the
civil penalty related to the "circumstances" of the alleged violations.
In calculating the appropriate civil penalty for the alleged EPCRA
violations, the EPA relied on supplemental information obtained from
Company personnel. The EPA sent two separate Information Requests to
obtain this additional information. One critical item of information the EPA
requested was the amount of TCE solvent present at the Company's facility
during each year. Based on the responses provided by the Company, the EPA
determined that the amount of TCE present during the 1987 through 1991
reporting periods was greater than five times the reporting threshold. This
translated into a Level B category for the "gravity of violation" component of
the penalty. The Penalty Policy directs that the penalty range for a Level 1
"extent of deviation" (failure to submit forms) and a Level B "gravity of
violation" is $13,200-$16,500 per violation. [Note: If less than 50,000
pounds of TCE was present at the facility during any one of the reporting
periods (1987 through 1991), the penalty range would have been reduced by
half to $6,600-$8,250 per violation (designated a Level C "gravity of
violation")].
3.

Mitigation of the Proposed Civil Penalty

The EPCRA Penalty Policy states that the EPA may consider as an
aggravating factor "any actual problems that first responders and emergency
managers encountered because of the failure to ... submit reports ... in a
timely manner," as circumstances to be considered in assessing the appropriate penalty within the applicable range.82 In addition, the Policy allows
consideration of the "potential for harm" resulting from the nonreporting, and
the public policy against undermining the statutory or regulatory purposes of
the EPCRA program.83
The EPA personnel substantially increased the proposed penalty because
local fire department and police department personnel encountered substantial
problems on the date of the employee accident. For example, fire and police
personnel were not aware that the injured workers were being overcome by
TCE vapors, and were unsure of the level of protection needed to safely enter
the tank to rescue the unconscious workers. Although we successfully argued
that the workers' injuries were solely workplace safety and OSHA issues,
EPA personnel maintained that the alleged injuries to the fire and police
82.
83.

Id. at *36.
Id. at *34.
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personnel demonstrated that the EPCRA noncompliance created a dangerous
situation. In a September 1993 newspaper article about the accident, the EPA
Attorney was quoted as stating, "Fifteen people who tried to rescue [the
employee,] including eight firefighters and four police officers, were treated
for varying chemical bums. The missing8 4Tier I Inventory Forms were
intended to prevent just that sort of danger.Y
Based on subsequent investigations, the EPA's statements that 15
rescuers were injured at the time of the accident were inaccurate and
misleading. A number of rescue personnel were sent to the local hospital,
with one firefighter kept for observation for approximately 8 hours. Although
the alleged "injuries" were suspect, there was some documentation to support
the EPA's argument that the first responders were physically affected by the
TCE vapors and encountered problems caused by lack of information. As
explained in the Penalty Policy, actual harm and problems encountered by
emergency and rescue personnel are consequences that relate to the core of the
EPCRA regulatory program. 85
The original administrative complaint issued by the EPA requested a civil
penalty of $219,450 to be paid within 30 days. In our discussions with the
EPA, we argued for reductions in the assessed civil penalty on the grounds
that the company had "substantially complied" with the program; that the
"circumstances" of the alleged violations did not warrant the maximum
penalty within the range; that the amounts of TCE present at the facility was
actually lower than the 50,000 pound threshold; and that the civil penalty was
generally excessive. We also argued that the EPA should select the lower
bounds of the penalty range, due to the company's "good faith" in resolving
the noncompliance and agreement not to proceed to hearing.
The EPA responded that medical records and related documentation
established at least minor "injuries" to emergency response personnel. The
EPA also believed that "substantial compliance" through local fire department
inspections addressed only one of the three points of compliance (i.e., local
fire department, LEPC, and SERC), the amounts of TCE at the facility
exceeded 50,000 pounds as documented in the company's responses to official
EPA Information Requests, and that the EPA considered the July 1992
incident a potential undermining of EPCRA program goals.
Initially, the EPA agreed to reduce the civil penalty from $219,450 to
$186,531 plus interest based on the company's "good faith" in responding to
the complaint. After submittal of additional information regarding "ability to

at 5.

84.

State Investigation QuestionsPlantSafety, THE DETROrr NEWS, September 9, 1993,

85.

ECPRA, supra note 74, at *4-12.
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pay/continue in business" and the "degree of culpability," the EPA agreed to
further reductions in the civil penalty to $175,500 to be paid in quarterly
installments.
An administrative consent agreement and final order was executed to
formalize the settlement agreement. Pursuant to the settlement, the company
was allowed to pay the penalty in four quarterly installments over a one-year
period.
I. ECONOMIC BENEFIT OF NONCOMPLIANCE

The government's goal in every enforcement action is to recover any
economic benefit that may accrue as a result of delayed pollution control
investment, thus removing the economic advantage a violator gained over
competitors that complied on time. The concept of economic benefits
through noncompliance, often referred to as "BEN," is relatively easy to
understand. A company that delays installation of pollution control equipment
saves money by delaying the purchase of equipment thereby earning interest
on the money it has not spent and by not paying the annual costs of operating
and maintaining the equipment needed for compliance. 6 Delays in spending
money on pollution control allows the company to use the money it saves for
other, revenue-producing activities and therefore gain an economic advantage
over its competitors that have complied on time. Alternatively, the company
may realize an economic benefit by completely avoiding expenses that it
otherwise would have incurred had it timely complied. For example, the
company completely avoids the expenses associated with operating and
maintaining pollution control equipment that itfailed to install or installed
late.
A.

METHODOLOGY OF CALCUIATING "BEN"

The EPA uses the "BEN" computer model to calculate the economic gain
from noncompliance.87 The computer program compares the present value of
the cost of compliance with the present value of noncompliance and the
difference equals the net gain from noncompliance. The model uses default
values when the EPA believes that data supplied by a polluter is inaccurate.

86. EPA, Guidancefor Calculating the Economic Benefit ofNoncompliancefor a Civil
Penalty Assessment, reprintedin 17 ENvTL LAW REPORTER 25,085 (Nov. 5, 1987).
87. EPA BEN User's Manual, supra note 48.
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PROBLEMS WITH EPA'S "BEN" METHODOLOGY AND RECENT CASE LAW

Since BEN was adopted, its use has been controversial."8 A public
interest group sued the EPA in 1993, alleging that the EPA deceived alleged
violators during penalty negotiations "by using a discredited [BEN] Model
.. . .,"9 The Washington Legal Foundation successfully moved for release of
the EPA internal documents pertaining to the BEN model and changes made
to it which lowered penalty amounts. The documents included the User's
Guide and an "internal" memorandum stating that the EPA was under no
obligation to inform alleged violators of changes made to the BEN model.'
In what has become known as the Dean Dairy case, 9' the U. S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, lacking guidance from
economic experts, accepted a novel theory of economic benefit advanced by
the government. The court accepted the government's claim that the proper
measure of economic benefit gained by the company as a result of the alleged
environmental violations included the net revenues obtained during the period
of noncompliance by not reducing plant production sufficiently to achieve
compliance.92 The court reasoned that by producing less product, the facility
would have generated a lower volume of the wastewater which caused
violation of applicable effluent limitations.93
The district court's decision was disturbing because it followed the
parties' stipulation that the company enjoyed no "economic benefit" as
defined under existing EPA guidance and legal precedent, by delaying the
costs associated with the wastewater pretreatment systems that ultimately
achieved compliance. Without expert testimony at trial to provide a proper
framework for its analysis of economic benefit, the Dean Dairy court accepted
a theory of economic benefit that was in direct conflict with previous
decisions, EPA guidance, and fundamental economic principles. The decision
accepts a novel theory that economic benefit includes not only the traditional
concept of the benefit from delayed and avoided compliance costs, but also
"wrongful profits" earned during the period of noncompliance.

88. See generally Robert H. Fuhrman, A Discussionof Technical Problems with EPA 's
BEN Model, I ENVTL LAWYER 561 (Feb. 1995) (evaluating the application of EPA's BEN
Model and its attempts to assess civil penalties).
89. EPA Accused of Deception in Use of BEN Model to Negotiate Violators'
EnvironmentalFines,7 Toxics L. REP. 348 (Aug. 25, 1993).
90. See Release of EPA Documents on BEN Model ProvidesAmmunition for Defense
Attorneys, 24 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1462 (Dec. 3, 1993).
91. U.S. v. Municipal Auth. of Union Township and Dean Dairy Prod., Inc., 929
F.Supp. 800 (M.D. Pa. 1996).
92. Id. at 806.
93. Id. at 807.
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The district court judgment imposing a civil penalty in excess of four
million dollars in the Dean Dairy case was recently affirmed on appeal to the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals.94
IV.

SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS

Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs) have been used in settling
enforcement actions since the early 1980s. A SEP is a settlement between the
EPA and a violator that reduces a proposed penalty in return for the violator
performing an environmentally beneficial project.95 The EPA defines SEPs
as "environmentally beneficial projects which a defendant or respondent
agrees to undertake in settlement of an enforcement action, but which the
defendant or respondent is not legally required to perform."96
A.

EPA's SEP GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS

SEPs can be used to settle judicial or administrative enforcement actions
and citizen suits. The EPA expects a SEP to cost a company more than the
amount of reduction of a fine. At a minimum, the reduction in a fine cannot
exceed the benefits gained from the violation. A SEP may be a depreciable
asset whereas the fine which it offsets is not tax deductible. Environmentalists frequently support the use of SEPs because they result in environmental
improvement rather than in money going to the U.S. Treasury.
The EPA's original SEP policy was published February 12, 1991, as
"Policy on the Use of Supplemental Environmental Projects in Enforcement
Settlements."'97 On May 10, 1995, EPA published the interim version of its
revised policy on the use of SEPs.9" On May 5, 1998, the EPA issued final
policy guidance to refine and clarify the appropriate use of SEPs in settlements of environmental enforcement cases.99

94. U.S. v. Municipal Auth. of Union Township and Dean Dairy Prod., Inc., 150 F.3d
259, 267 (3rd Cir. 1998) (noting that no other Clear Water Act penalty case had ever adopted
the concept of "wrongful profits," the court of appeals nevertheless affirmed the lower court's
"approximation" of the economic benefit that resulted from the admitted noncompliance as a
decision falling squarely within the district court's discretion).
95. Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg.
24,796 (1988).
96. Id. at 24,798.
97. Leslie J. Kaschak, Supplemental EnvironmentalProjects: Evolution of a Policy,
2 ENvTL LAW 465, 469-70 (1996).
98. Interim Revised EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 60 Fed.
Reg. 24,856 (1995).
99. Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg. 24,
796 (1988).
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In general, the new 1998 guidance document is consistent with the EPA's
1991 SEP Policy, but it has some important clarifications and enhancements
of the EPA's previous position on the use of SEPs in settlements and should
promote the use of SEPs.1 Those distinctions are summarized below:
*

*

*

The new SEP policy establishes a specific five-step
process which should be followed by agency personnel
in reviewing and approving SEPs in the context of a
proposed settlement.
The 1998 guidance specifies "legal guidelines" which
the EPA and states will use to determine whether or
not the proposed SEPs can be approved. Of significance is the requirement that all SEPs must be identified within the context of the settlement agreement; the
EPA will not allow the settlement agreement to specify
a dollar amount to be spent on a SEP, the details of
which are to be determined at some later date.
The new SEP policy identifies two additional categories of SEPs which were not included in the 1991
guidance. For example, the EPA now allows a project
focused on "public health" related to the actual or
potential damage that may have been caused by the
alleged violation. In addition, the EPA now recognizes
a SEP for "emergency planning and preparedness"
which includes such activities as providing computers
and software, communication systems, HAZMAT
equipment, etc. to assist local organizations with their
EPCRA programs.
The 1991 guidance allowed the use of environmental
assessments and audits as SEPs, but the new SEP
policy expands and enhances the types of assessments
and audits that are authorized as SEPs. For example,
the new guidance clearly allows as approvable SEPs,
pollution prevention assessments, as well as site
assessments on the environmental conditions of the
site or facility."'1

100. See Steven A. Herman, EPA 's Revised SupplementalEnvironmentalProjects Policy
Will Produce More Environmentally Beneficial Enforcement Settlements, NAT'L ENVTL.
ENFORCEMENT J. 9 (July 1995).
101. Id. at 10.
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The most significant change in the new SEP guidance is the adoption of
fairly rigid procedures for calculation of the "net-present after-tax costs of the
SEP" which will be used to offset civil penalties for the alleged violations.
This new guidance establishes a bright line test which requires the overall
settlement (which includes a SEP) to recover at a minimum, "the economic
benefit of noncompliance plus 10% of the gravity component" of the assessed
civil penalty, or in the alternative, "25% of the gravity component only"
° In addition, the new
whichever dollaramount is greater."
guidance specifies

the procedures to be used to calculate the value of the SEP and recommends
use of an EPA computer model called "PROJECT."
The EPA has acknowledged that all federal administrative settlements are
using the new 1998 Policy on the use of SEPs. 03 In addition, the EPA and the
U.S. Department of Justice are now utilizing SEPs more frequently in the
context of federal judicial settlements embodied in court-approved Consent
Decrees. To a much lesser extent, the Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency ("IEPA") and Attorney General's Office are following the EPA's SEP4
Policy and incorporating SEPs more often in settling enforcement actions. 1
The IEPA recently entered into an August 1996 agreement where SEPs were
used to offset civil penalties in a Saline County enforcement action.
B.

APPLICATION OF THE SEP POLICY TO ACTUAL ENFORCEMENT CASES

Following are two examples of the application of the SEP Policy in the
settlement of actual environmental enforcement actions. Although both
proceedings are a matter of public record, identities have been omitted or
altered to preserve confidentiality and to protect the privacy rights of the
individuals involved.'0 5
Case History No. 1. This first example of a settlement incorporating
SEPs illustrates an unusually liberal scope of the types of projects approved
by the government. It also serves as an example of a principal benefit of
incorporating SEPs in a settlement, which is to create or increase "good will"
in the community most impacted by the environmental harm caused by the
noncompliance.
102.

Id. at 11.

103. Interview with Ann Klein, Esq., EPA Office of Enforcement and Compliance
Assurance (June 15, 1998).
104. Interview with Matthew J. Dunn, Office of the Attorney General, State of Illinois
(Jan. 1998).
105. Identification of the entities and individuals involved as well as copies of nonprivileged public documents generated in these proceedings can be obtained by contacting the
author.
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Company A acquired a pulp and hardboard mill that had been in
existence since the 1940s. Similar to many other industrial operations sited
fifty years ago, the mill was located within the limits of a small municipality,
surrounded by a lower-income residential area.
Operations at the mill generated a variety of odorous emissions, which
at times, caused a significant impact on the neighboring residents. Previous
owners of the mill had ignored residents' complaints and managed to avoid
any significant enforcement action through threats of closing the facility. The
prospect of losing several hundred jobs in a community whose economy
depended on the mill was an effective deterrent.
Soon after acquiring the mill, Company A encountered labor disputes
which resulted in breaking the union and downsizing of the work force. At the
same time, the nuisance odors continued and the state agency became less
responsive to threats of economic blackmail.
After more than five years of operation by Company A, the state
environmental agency brought an administrative enforcement action for a
variety of air pollution violations and for maintaining a public odor nuisance.
The Agency's initial demand requested over $350,000 in civil penalties.
Through the course of defending the action, the Agency was persuaded to
reduce its proposed civil penalty to $99,000. Those reductions were based in
large part on the Company's commitment to install new pollution control
equipment to reduce odorous emissions from specific process lines.
During our discussions with Company A's management, it was
acknowledged that the civil penalty should be applied toward SEPs that would
create "good will" in the community. It was thought that increasing "good
will" would neutralize the effect of certain individuals with strong feelings
against Company A and would reduce the number of individuals who were
willing to call-in complaints to the Agency about any odors from the mill,
even tolerable odors.
The ultimate resolution of the enforcement action resulted in the
following breakdown in the total $99,000 paid in "penalties" for the air quality
violations and public nuisance:
*
•
•

•

$35,000 to reimburse the State for its costs of investigation and enforcement (non-negotiable)
$20,000 in true civil penalties
$20,000 in SEP "donations" to two elementary schools
"for the purchase of multimedia computer hardware
and software for environmental training of school
students"
$8,000 SEP donation to a non-profit local conservation
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*
0

group to "provide environmental education training to
school children"
$8,000 SEP donation to a local fishing club "toward
the costs of installing small boat ramps"
$8,000 SEP donation to the municipality for equipment
to outfit the local Emergency Response Team

Since the settlement was finalized, Company A has noticed more favorable
treatment by the local media and a substantial reduction in the number of
complaints made to the state Agency. In addition, residents who notice
objectionable odors will call the mill with complaints rather than the Agency
and are more willing to forgive short-term nuisance odors caused by
malfunctions or process upsets. As Company A completed its agreed-upon
compliance program and reduced the level of nuisance odors, its "good will"
in the community has further improved.
Case History No. 2. The second case example of the application of the
SEP policy illustrates how the company received a return of some of the value
of its civil penalty. This occurred through physical improvements to a
manufacturing plant that were paid for, in large part, by the SEP component
of the civil penalty.
Company B operated a gray iron foundry located in an industrial section
of a large metropolitan area. The foundry had been constructed in the early
1950's and certain "scrubbing" equipment used to control particulate
emissions from one of its molding lines was old technology. The existing
control equipment could achieve compliance with the applicable emission
limits, provided it was operated correctly and maintained frequently.
Due to general economic upturn in its business, Company B had initiated
a program to improve and replace manufacturing equipment and pollution
control equipment at the foundry. Equipment and process lines were
scheduled for improvements as budgeting allowed, but all plans were subject
to management approval.
Based on opacity observations and resident complaints, the government
agency initiated an administrative enforcement action against Company B for
violating applicable particulate emission and opacity limits. The initial civil
penalty proposed by the Agency was in excess of $50,000. The case was
ultimately settled for the payment of a $3,000 fine and for a SEP which
required replacement of the aging "scrubbing" controls on the molding lines
with an advanced, state-of-the-art baghouse system. Because the new controls
reduced particulate emissions more than was required to meet the applicable
emission limits, the equipment qualified as a SEP despite the fact that it would
directly benefit the company.
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Use of the SEP Policy in this case allowed the company to purchase new,
modem control equipment for its own foundry, with penalty money that
otherwise would have gone to the State. Although the expenditure was
substantial, it was already planned and budgeted for. Finally, the improved
pollution controls provided insurance against future violations of the
applicable regulations and government prosecutions.
CONCLUSION

Environmental protection laws and regulations continue to increase in
number and stringency. With this reality facing the regulated community and
in particular heavy industry, enforcement actions become a distinct possibility
for many companies.
If faced with an environmental enforcement action, there are strategies
that can be implemented to minimize the economic impacts of substantial
monetary penalties. Crucial to a successful strategy is recognizing the
statutory limits placed on the governments' discretion in calculating and
assessing proposed penalty amounts. Of equal import are the specific
statutory criteria that must be considered to mitigate and aggravate the dollar
amount of civil penalties deemed "appropriate." The EPA-developed
guidance on how to calculate penalties and how to apply the statutory factors
in mitigation and aggravation provide valuable insight and justification for
penalty reductions, particularly with respect to the "seriousness" of the alleged
noncompliance. Finally, the use of Supplemental Environmental Projects can
allow the return of a portion of the economic value of a civil penalty through
improving facility processes and creating good will in the community most
likely to have been affected by the noncompliance.

